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Introduct i on.
.According to the present law, the actual as distnrgithed
from the nominal dissolution of a (o;poration, mar be accorvp
lished in four ways.
I pv ,xpiration of Charter.
II F-r the Voluntary Surrender of its ranchises.
1I PIT a forfeiture of its t"ranchises.
-IV "y Re peal of Charter when such power has been reserved
b* the Legislature.
The present article aeals mainly with with the first two of
these provisions.
PMr. Coo in his work on Stock and Stockholders ',makes
a more extended classification. To wvn 1 FBT a forfeiture of
its franchises by the adjudication of a court; 2 The loss
of its charter by a charter provision to that e~fect,in case
a corporation, ce-tairi thiryis within a certain time. 6 The
repeal of its charter under the reserved power of the State.
4 The voluntary surrender of its fraichises by the stockhla
or 5 The expiration of the time limited for its existance in
the charter. : any authorities add, at failure of an
essential part of the corporate or ,anisati on. It seerms that
divisions one arid tro of Mr. Cook's classification may be
united, for a failure to perform a condition annexed to the
charter , is a case for judicial fo-feiture.
It is very impo-tarit at the out set, before makiri,: a crit-
ical examination of the authorities to notice that the court
use the t,3-r "dissolution" in two ways, muaninw; first, the
actual terrination of the leg-al existance of a corporation
o- the extinguishment of its franchises, and in the other or
secondary sense the corporation may be '"issolvw& for the
purpoes of enforcing a statutorl, liability, though the
cor0orate franchises may still exist.
The docto-ine of "th, failu-e of essential part" is
acxredited to Chancellor VCllworth 1 fg. 590. He calls our
attention to a case I Roll.jAbr.514 (1) "-,here the corporatio
was composed of a certain number of brothers aid a certain
niumber oP sisters, and all the sisters "lure deau, anc it was
a*&s awrited that grants and acts done b- the two brothers
afterwards were void; for after the sisters were dead, it uwa
riot a perfict cor;0oration." Such a doctrine it seems is
entirely inapplicable to modern corporations having capital
stock The basis of membersbip being in these cases the holv-
of shares. 7 * c )
Abaient of Suits upon Dissolution.
The rule of the early common law, that all suits against
a person abate at the death of such person, has been appl-
ied in many cases by analogy to suits against corporations.
The rigor of the early common law was gradually modified,
and at the time when the corporation law came into promin-
ance; it was well settled that an action on contract,
involving a property right, could be revived and continued
against the executors and administrafors of the decedent,
after proper application to the court,
Substantially this practice is applied in corporation
law. At the present time all actions involvi ng property
rights pending against corporations upon their dissolution;
may be revived and continued against the receiver or trustee.
But in some of the earlier cases this was not done. The
cause of action was said to abate, they reasoned that as a\
deprived the corporation of its legal existance, a judgment
against it would be a mere nullity, there being no person
against whom to enfotree it.(l)
(1) Merritt v Suffolk Bk.31 Meo57;Terry v Merchants Bk.66 Ga
On the other hand it is equally well settled that at
conmmon law a tort action dies with the death of a person.
If we follow the analogy as before, we reach the conclusion
that all torts abate by the dissolution of the corporation.
The question is coming up under the statutes of this
State apparently for the first time, the effort to sustain
a tort action is based upon #8 of lR.S.600. The statute is
as follows "Upon the dissolution of any corporation...the
directors of the affairs of such corporation at the time of
its dissolution, shall be trustees of the creditors and
stockholders of the dissolved corporation, and shall have
full power to settle the affairs of the corporation,
collect and pay the outstanding debts: By Ch. 294 #4 of the
Lawsof 1832,such an action did not abate, this act was
repealed by the general repealing act of 1880 Ch. 245 #10
and in its place was enacted ##755-66 of the Code of Civil
Proceadure.
This question may be illustrated by the case of Hepworth
v Union Perry Co.0l) Here an action was brought against a
common carrier for damages caused by an alleged assault and
battery committed upon plaintiff by defendant's servants
(1) 62 Hun 295;aff.131 N.Y.645,no opinion.
while the parties were at issue the charter of the defendant
company expired. A motion was made to continue the action
against the trustees of the dissolved corporation.
Mr. Justice Barnard was of the opinion that the act of
1832 was dec4araLtory merely of the comtnon law, and that its
repeal did not effect or alter the inherent power of the
Court. And also that Othe statute creditor 2nbraces those
persons whose claims are based on torts. The lawsmakes the
directors trustees to settle the affairs of the corporation
Justice Cullen in a similar case says (1) "The power
given to the trustees is 'to settle its affairs',is a term
comprehensive enough to include all liabilities: He then
argues that the ar6 should recieve a liberal construction
with a view of aiding Justice. Continuing he says,*It
would be inequitable to deprive the plaintiff of satisfactin
of his claimby the voluntary act of the real parties in
interest-the stockholders. Lastly the action should be
continued under the provisions of the code, in as much as
the Oode is simply a revision of the former law, and a
a revision is presumed not to alter the existing law.
(1) Grafton v Union Ferry CO.19 Sup.966.
"I do not believe, says he, that it wqs the intention of tho
Legislature to abrogate the rule, but rather to substitute
the mode of proceeding for the revival of actions provided
for in the Code!
The other view is ably maintained by Justices Dykman and
Osborne. The gist of their argument is that a person who
is injured by a tort is not a creditor until his damages
become liquidated... 'A cause of action for a tort is not an
indebtedness, and it would be contrary to all analogies of
the law to it so ..It requires a special statute to enable
actions for wrongs to the property rights or interests of
another to be maintained against the executor or adminis -
trator of the wrong doer:
I must leave this subject unsettled in thie State the
General Term having reached opposite conclusions. As the
cases of McCulloch v Norwood (1) and Sturges v Vanderbilt
(2)went off on questions of practice. The Court of Appeals
will be free to adopt either view. (3)
(1) McCulloch v Norwood 58N.Y,562.
(2) Sturges v Vanderbilt 73 N.Y.388.
(3) See also Blake v Portsmouth R.R.39 N.H.435where the stat-
ute provided for the continuance of all actions against
the corporation.
The Ways in which Dissolution may take Place,
I By Expiration of Charter.
In this country it has been almost the universal practice
to charter business corporations, or corporations having a
capitol stock for a limited period of years; and upon the
conmaing of the date named in the charter for its expiration,
the corporation ipso facto ceased to ,exist. This is well
stated by Mr. Justice Story in Greeley v Smith (1), the case
before him involved the construction of one of the charters
of a national bank, hi said, "Many of our banks are, by law
limited to a term of years for their corporate existence,
and if there is no saving when the term expires, the
corporation is de facto dead.'
And as the corporation is not in esse, no judicial
detarmination of its dissolution is necessary. IN Sturges v
Vanderbilt(2) it was argued that as to creditors a judici~l
uc*crrlnt~u: " ' e. av;Justice :lapello in, replv i,
"All the cases cited in support of this proposition relate
to a dissolution in consequence of insolvency, or nor-user,
(1) Greeley v Smith 3Story 657.
(2) Sturges v Vanderbilt 73 N.Y.388.
or mis-user of the corporate franchises. The principle
upon which th&A class of cases rests is not applicableto a
dissolution by expiration of the charter, The dissolution
in such a case is rendered by act of the Legislature itself.
The limited time of existence has expired and no judicial
determination is requisite. The corporation is de facto
dead.*
But when the continuance of the corporation beyomd a
fixed period is made to depend upon the performance of a
condition, the non-performance of the condition is a mere
ground of forfeiture. The corporation still contimues to
exist unti declared dissolved by a proceeding to enforce
the forfeiture.*
ft
II By the Voluntary Surender of its Franchises.
1 Abandmont of Sorporate Business with consent of
all the Stockholders.
Tt is an unguestioned rule, says Mr. Cook, that all the
stockholders ,by unamious consent, may effect a dissolution
of the corporation by the surender of the corporate
franchises W' This proposition while it seems to be fundl-
mentally sound is difficult of application,and seems only to
arise in cases where the corporation has abandoned the
undertaking for which it was chartered.
The leading authority in this country is Slee vBloom (2)
where the court held in an opinion by Chiaf Justice Ipencer
overuling Chancellor Kent (3) that the corporation was
dissolved. The Dutcher Cotton Mfg. was a duly organised
corporation existing under the laws of the State of New
York. In February 1818 all the property of the corporation
was sold under executionthe corporatjon had totally ceased
doing business the preceeding December. Bill was filed in
(1) Cook on Stock.#629
(2) Slee v Bloom 19 Johns.456.
(W)id 7 Johns Ch.376.
April 1S19 asking; for a decree declaring the corporation to
be dissolved, with a view of obtaining the enfozrserent
of thu stockholders liability under the statute. The Ch. J.
says, "Th. -round da, which I p lace my opinion, that the
corporation is dib solveo is that they have done aid su_.u_.
ed to be done acts uquivcklent to a direct surender.
The Chancellor, corieeds, and it does not in roi judgment
admit o " doubt, that a corpor'ation may be di.solveci by a
surrender of all their corpo-ate i~ropertv and corporate
rights .... 3_erin an act to be done which destroys the end
and object "or which the corporation was institutea
must be equivolent to t doing an act ,,rhich+ roduces the
very same consequences, surender is an act in pais; it
can, therefore be no objection in this case, that the
acts wlhich have dissolved the corporation are acts in pais.i
In 'ikles v Pank of Rochester (1) the corporation had
ceased to do business for- over a year after the recovery
by the bank of a judgment and execution. The bank had been
a stockholder in the "defunct" corporation. A bill was filed
in equity tO have the sale set aside, alleging that the
(1) I[ikles v Pank o-' Rochester I11 h.11 .
corporation '-,as dlsslveci arid praying for an accounting by
the bank , as a tenant in common of the assatts of the corp-
oration. Upon demurrer the court said"the stockholders of
a corporation ar ,either tenants in common of the corporateo-x
nor copartners either before or after its dissolution."
'urther illustrations are the cases of More v Whiticomb
and Penman v Friggs. In the former the court held that a
failure to hold annual meetings together with an abandonment
of a railroad for seven years, constituted a virtual
dissolution of the corporation. In the latter the court
formulated the rule thus: If a corporation suffer acts to
be done which destroy the end and object for which it was
instituted, it is equivolent to a surrender of its rights."
MToore v VWhiticomb 3 1,o.543 and Penman v Priggs I Hop. Ch/
300;S.C.on appl.8 Cow.387.
State must Accept Surrender of 'rarnchises.
On principle it would seem that although the corporation
has abandouriu its enterprise and is de facto dead, yet it
still rureains a corporation de jure in esse until the acce
ceptance of its franchise by the State. For it has been
held in the Darthmouth College case that a charter of a
corporation is a contract between the State and the corp-
oration, and if so, then it is a term of that contract that
thevcorporatorsiVill undertake to carry on the business for
which it was organised until the expiration of its charter,
or an acceptance by the State of its corporate franchises
relieving it from so doing. The Masschusetts Courts were
the first to recognise this principle, Justice Morton says(A
Charters are in many respects compacts between the Govern-
ment and the corporators and as the former cannot deprive
the latter of their franchises in violation of the compact
without the consent of the forrme-...The surrender of a /can
only be made by some formal solemqact of the corporation
(1) Boston Glass Co. v Lang don 24 Pick.49.
arid will be of no avail until accepted by the State There
must be the same agreement to dissolve, that ther was to
form the compact. Tt is the acceptance which gives efficacy
to the surrender. "
A late case in the United States Supreme Court shows the
extent to which the court will carry this doctbrine; Fr.
-Justice JacksDn speaking forithe court says, (1) "The aver-
ments that said corporation paid all other debts and
thereafter distributed their remaining assets among their
stockholders and have since no use of their franchises,
arid have no agents or officerskpon whom process has been
served, and no assets out of which any judgment against
tham could be satisfied, fall far short of a dissolution
such as would prevent a suit against the corporation or
their trustees."
"A corporation is not dissolved by ceasing to exercise
its powers,rnor because its stockholders amd directors may
consider it to be 'defunct',,' (2).
(I) Swan Land Co. v 7rank et al 13 Sup. Ct.R. 691.
(2) Rollins v Clary 33 .,e.136.
Fut flo one will deny that as private corporations uither of
those companies may abandon its charter and dissolve itsol,'
except so far as its creditors may have a right to object,
and so far as its public duties as conservator's of a highwa,
mayf tend to limit its powers in this respect: and the
(1)
Legislature ma,7, at pleasure, release it from the limitation'
"It does not follow that a corporation is dissolved by
the sale of its visible and tangeable property, for' the
payment of debts, and by the temporary suspention of busi-
ness, so lon6 as it has the moral and legal capacity to;,Aekse
its subscriptions, call iii more capital and re-assume its
business." (2).
Where the Legislature provides that when certain corpor-
ations become insolvent, or where they ease:.tQ do business
for a certain time, a proceeding may be commenced to forfeit
their charters. Under these statutes it seems that a volune
tar +surender by a corporation of its franchises under such
circumstances works a dissolution of their corporate exis*-)
erce. And says the Vermont court (3) "It is quite probable
(I) Lauman v Lebanon Valley R?R? 30 Pa. St.42.
(2) Brunkichoff v Frown 7 Johns. Ch.217.
(3) Brandon Iron Co. v Gleason 24 Vt 28.
that a lagal surrender may be presumed where for a s ifficent
length oF' timu there has existed an entire non-user of corpe
orate franchises."
2any of thu courts insist that the surrender of the
franchises of a corporatlon mustbe judicially determined in
an action brought for this purpose, and that until so
determined the corporation is du jure in esse. "A corpora-
tion may by virtue of proceedings against it, or by reason
of its pecuniary conditions, cease to exist fo- all practi-
cal purposes, for which it was cr ated or for 'which'¢ a
be
corporation may exist, but it cannot be held tOA actually
dissolved till sb adjudged and determined either by judici-
al sentence or by the soverign power...It may be dormant
its vitality suspended - as perhaps the exercise of
corporate powers, but it may nevertheless be liable to be
proceeded against by action, for any purpose for which an
action is available to any one having a right to sue."(1)
This is equally true of religeous and charitable corporation1
having no capital stock. As decided by the court in Magee
v The Genesee Academy 12) The corporate legal existeace
(1) Kincaid v Divinelle 59 N.Y.551.
(2) Iages v Genesee Acad. 17 N.Y.St.RA423.
continues although it has ceased to exist for all 4ducation-
al purposes, and no longer ex(.rcises the powers conferred
by its charter . Acorporation cant bc held to bu dissolved
until so adjudged . (i). But a stockholdk mair b. cstopped
from denying thu corporate existance, by actually parti.ci-
pating in the distribution of Thu corporate assets.
It seems that the contra, is the Alabama rule *th1 e court
held that proceedings under th6 statute were urnecessary,
saying that 1h4 corporation could waivu a statuto-y p-ocuud-
ing einacted for its benefit. (2).
But for the purpose of aiding creditors)i" thei- -ffort
to obtain satisfaction of their dabts thL corporation may
be considered dissolved. In Agricultural Association v I n .
Co. (6)the corporation was insolvent the coutt aaid
"for all practical purposes, as to creditors it was dissolvd
within the meaning of the statute. Any other doctrrinv
would be unreasonable, and would render the the statute,
and the liability it imposes, incapable of affording the
creditor of the corporation the benefit and sacaitv
intended. " "The courts of this State consider that for
(1) Applied in Fradt v Penedict 17 N.Y.93.
(2) Savage v WalsQ 26 Ala.(319. See also 1,obile R.R. v State
29 Ala. 573.6 Coal CO v R. R. 4G&J. (md. ) I pAll-2.
(3) Agr. Ass. v Ins.CO/ 70 AIl .I1O.
the remedy against thu individual member, and in favor of
creditors a virtual surrwnder of the corporate -ights,and
a dissolution of the corporation may be presumed from a
transfer of all its assets, and other circumstances which
would not ordinarily create a dissolution per se."(1).
Two other cases illustrate the application of this rule,
Hollingshead v Woodard (2) and Farmer Bank v Gallaher. (3)
in the former the court said that the statute of limitation
bean to run from the date of the abandonment. And in
the latter the creditor was allowed to proceed against a
stockholder of the "defunct" corporation; the stock was
issued at an overvaluation. No dissolution had taken place
in either case." (4)
(i) Kelhor v Lodeman 11 Mo.Appl.550. Other illustrations
are Slec v BlooM, Penman v Briggs, and Brurikichoff v
Benedict all cited supra.
(2) Hollingshead v Woodard 107 N.Y.96.
(3) -Parmer Bk. v Gallaher 53 M' o. Appl.482.
(4)See also Bk.of ?oughpei pee v Oboston 24 Wend.479;
Wait or Insolv. Corp. #345.
'ailurw to 'ile Annual Reports.
Whar -n abantlment takes placu and the corporation has
no assets. The t,,ndency of the mociern cases is to hold that
the corporation is so far dissolved as to relieve the
trustees from the statutory liability of filing annual
reports. The reason being thet the statute is penal in its
operation and should be strictly construed. (I) So where
a receiver has been appointed and the property is in the
possession of the Court. (L)
But where there are still assets, and the trustees are
in active possession of the assets of the company they are
bound to account. (3)
(1) Bruce v Olatt 80 N.Y.379; and Van Arnburgh v Baker
81 N.Y.46.
(2) Huguenot v Sthdwelle 74 N.Y.621.
(3) Sanborn v Lefferts 58 N.Y.621.
II Py Acts of the Majority Stockholdurs.
The solution of thu question presented, whether the
majority of the stockholders of a corporation can declare
and enfource a dissolution of thu corporation in the absence
of statute; takes us back to the fundimental principles of
corporation law. On the one hand it is argued that a
corporation is essentially a co-partnership organised under
special laws, for the purpose of getting a limited share-
holders liability. That its members delegate their power
to act to agents appointed by them,and that within the
scope of theirfbusiness~the act of the majority stockholders
acting in good faith are binding upon the minority; as a
single member of a co-partnership can terminate the corpor-
ate relation so the majority of the stockholders can termin-
ate the corporate relation, save only when prevented by the
statute.
Upon the other hand it is argued that a corporation ia
not in its nature like a partnership, but is an artificial
person recognised by the law and created by statute for the
purpose of accomplishing certain things, and that its
stockholders are only a means to aid this creature of the
law in carrying out the object for which the law incorporatd
it. While it is true that the will of the majority express
es the will of the corporation, this will is intended to
aid and further the corporate being, and can not be extend-
ed to destroy the being it is desined to aid
Having now a general idea of the thoery upon which the
argument proceeds: I will take up the cases, examing those
first which hold that the majority of the stockholders
have such power.
The earliest case to treat of this subject is Ward v
The Society ofi Attorneys. (1) The question was presented
by an application to the~ourt for an injunction restraining
the majority of the members of the society from surrender-
ing their charter to the Kind with a view of obtaining
another allowing them to accumulate a library. The court
refused to grant the injzction, but saying that they would
reserve the merits until a final hearing.
(i) Ward v The Society of Attys. 1 Coll. (7ng. ) 370.
This case is followed by Treadwell v Salisbury Nlfg. Co. (1)
where the court after daciding the case on a jurisdictionel
question say, "But we entertain no doubt of thu right of a
corporation, established solely "or trading and manufact-
uring purposes, by a vote of the majority of their stock-
holders , to wind up their business, if in the exercise of
a sound business discretion they deem it exptdierit so to do/
not
..If this be~sowe d6 not see that any limit could be put
to the business of a trading corporation short of the
entire loss or destruction of the corporate property.
The stockholder~s would be compelled to carry it on until
it came to actual insolvency. Such a doctbrine is without
any support in reason or authority."
"Becoming incorporated for a specified object without
any specifie4 time for its continuance of the business is
no contract to continue it for ever, any more than articles
of partnership without stipulation as to time. There is no
reason why it should be construed into such a contract;
such is not implied by the charter, and a doctorine that all
the stockholders but one may be compelled to continue a
----- ---------------------------
(i) Treadwell v Salisbury f Tg. Co.7 Grey 393,404.
business which they find undesirable and unprofitable,
and wish to abandon, is so unreasonable and unjust that it
is not held to rise Ly implication, unless that implica-
tion is a mecessaryvone." (i) In this case,"The majority
of the corporators undertake a charter which specifies no
definate time for its continuance, have a right to abandon
the undertaking, and dispose of and divide the property,
the proceeding in this case is valid as against the
complainents as a lawful way of accomplishing that end
as to themn1(I) Or to say the same thing in another way,
"It is within the power of the stockholders to make the sale
of the assets of the corporation doing an unsuccessful and,
business." (2 and 3).
The New York Rule.
The comtrary doctorine is held in New York, Lousianna and
West Virginia. In Abbott v The American Rubber "o. (4)
(1) Black v Del. Canal Co.22 N.J.7q.405-15.
(2) Bery v Broach ( SV. (Miss. )117.
(6) See also Wilson v Central Pridgu Co.9%T.i.J79,3: Peo. v
C-llege of Pal. 38 Cal.166,where this doctorine was extend-
ed to religeous and charitable corps. in Hands v Holdbrook
9 77ed.351 similar transfe- held valid.
(4) Abbott v Ruober Co.33 Parb.578. In La. Curien v Sentini
16 La. An.27;7olar Star v P.S. 16 id.76. Hurst v Cox 3 seep.
(W.V a. ) 564.
Justice Southerland delivered the opinion of the court;
"I do riot think the directors, even with the consent of a
majority of the stochholders, had a right as against
stockholders not consenting, to discontinue its existance
and defeat the object of the organisation. 1 cannot presume
that the directors or a majority of the stockholders of
this corporation had a right by bhe laws of Corinectcuit by a
voluntary sale, to discontinue its existance, wind up and
defeat the purpose, object and business for which the
corporation was organised, even with the consent of a
majority of the stockholders, so as to bind the minority
not consenting, would be in effect depriving them of their
property without their consent.'
In Ward v Sae Ins. Co. (1) the court denied the right
of the stockholders to dissolve the corporation saying,
"7either were the directors of the corporatioleven with the
assent of the stockholders, authorised to discontinue their
corporate business and wind up the affairs of the corporatin
or to distribute the capital of the concern among the
stockholders unless by authority of a special statute,or
(1) Ward v Sea Insurance Co. 7 Pg.244.
under the decree od the Court declaring a dissolution. "
In this case the Court siezcd upon their failure tolelect
officers, and upon this ground declared a forfeiture and
appointed a receiver of their property.
Under the New York Statute.
The law :n New York has since been changed by the Code of
Civil Proceodure H2419-21, providing that when a majority
of the directors desuver that the property of the corp-
oration is not sufficent to pay its debts or "i- for any
reason they deem it beneficial to the interests of the
stockholders that the corporation should be dissolved, thay
may present a petition" to the Court praying for a dissolmti6 .
This statute has been liberally construed to)ds the
furtherance of justice. In a late case in the Court of
Appeals, Second Pivison. (i) Justice Varnholding that right
of granting a dissolution is discretionary with the Court,
assuming of coarse thatstatutory proceeding has beehfolloweQCz)
(~T ijich.v twley 132 i.Y. 212.
ortar1o vOrnorndaga Bk.7 Hun 549; Re Pvrrolusite Co.
29 Hun 429; Re Boynton Saw Co.34 Hun 669; Jurs v Leadville
Bk. 17 Pac.272.
Assignment for Penefit o," Creditors.
Tt seems to be well settled that at Common Law a corpora-
tion car make an assignrmcnt for thc benefit of creditors.
Cv'
A private person acting in good faith is allowed to pay hisA
in any way he pleases so long as he devotes his entire
property to the payment of his creditors. A corporation
should be allowed to do the same. The management of the
business is vested in the directors, who while acting in
good faith and within the scope of the business, have entire
control of the managemert of the corporation. The payment
of debts is but an incident of the businessarly doctvrine
which restricts this right, interfer% with the directors
power to rmanage its business. An assignment for benefit
of creditors is a mode of marshalling the corporate assets
for the payment of debts, and on principle should be
allowed. (1) Arecent case in the Court of Appeals takes this
viewsthey say (2) "Regarding the transaction...as a simple
preference of one creditor of the corporation, do not
(1) Ilyman v Perry 3 Wash St. 734; Haxtum v Pishop 3 Wend.13
(2) Coats v Donell 94H.Y. 168,78.
understand that such preference is unlawful.
The right of a failing debtor to prefer one creditor to
another in the distribution of his property, while it is
often regretted, is recognised both in law and equity.
A corporation in this respect stands the same right as an
individual. Tt may execute a mortgage or give a lien which
shall operate as a preferance, unlessed restrained by stat-
ute." The rule applies equally well to a religeouv or
charitable corporation. (i)
Under the New York Statute.
Pecause of the great practical importance of the right of a
corporation in the State of New York to make an assignment
for the benefit of creditorsI I will give a brief hisrory
of the statutory law in this State.
The first statute requiring attentiorn is Ch.325 of the
Laws of 1825;1 R/S.603,4 prohibited assignments by corpora-
tions actually insolvent, or in contemplation of insolvency
to any officer or stockholder of said company either direct-
ly or indirectly. Put k4 did "not apply/to any incorporated
(i) De Ryter v St. Peters Church 3 N.Y.239.
libiary or relierious society; nor to ani monied corporation
which shall have been created ,or whosecharter shall have
been renewed after the first of January 1128. " (1)
In 1882 the above section was repealed by Ch.402 739 nd
7i2187 of Ch.409 was put in its place. This section prohibitd
assignments to officers and stockholders,and prohibited the
giving of preferences by monied corporations. But #39 of
the Laws of 1882 was in turn amended by Ch. 434 of the Laws
of 1884. Thus restoring it to its origemaj standing as givn
above.
To surnerise, at common law corporations could make gen-
eral assignments. Under the law of 1825, all domestic (2)
corporations except monied or religious and charitable, were
prohibited from making assignments to officers or stockhold-
ers. From 1882-1884 the former provision was made applicable
to monied corporations and removed as to all others.
In 1884 the origenal provision was restored leaving unalt-
ered the inhibition against monied corporations.
This remained the law down to l,9O when all former provis-
ions were repialed. The present law may be found in -748 of
(1) Vol.1 R.S. #11 star pg. 605.
(2) Coats v Donell 94 N.Y.p.178.
the Stock Corporation law. (I) Under this section transfers
by corporations whey insolvent to any of its officers or
stockholders are prohibited. Put assignments may be made to
third persons provided no pro~ences are in, any Acreated. (2)
But when made by any corporation subject to the banking law
the transfer must be authorisect by a previously passed
resolution of its Poard of Directors, providing the property
transferred exceeds in valueRlOOO.
(1) L. '92 Ch.688;5N.Y.R.S. (8ed.) 4102.
(2) In Crompton v Miller 19 Sup.691 the attention of the
court was not called to the late statutory changes.
III By act of' the Legislature Declaring Corporation
Pissolved.
Ordinarily the repeal of the charter of a corporation by
the Legislature ix an involuntary dissolution so far as the
directors arid stockholders ofi the corporation are concerned,
but it is possible that the directors and stockholders may
petition the Legislature to dissolve the corporation.
A repeal of a charter brought about in this waV would be
within the domain of this thesis.
Since the decision of' the United States Supreme Court in
the Darthmouth College case the Legislatures of the various
States have been careful to reserve the right to repeal or
modify all charters granted to corporations. So that in
the cases we are to discuss, the contract obligation
be ween the State and the corporation is not involved.
"A repeal of a charter, sa %s Mr. Justice Blatcheord, (I)
does not of itself violate or impair thulvalidity of any
contract which the corporation has entered into.
But the Legislature cannot establish such rules in regard
to the management and dispotioni of the assets of the corp-
(Lathrop, vStedaz 13'Elatch.143.v ,
oration, that the avails shall be diverted from, or divided
unfairly or unequally among, the creditors, and thus irnPair
the obligation of contracts, or that the portion of the
avails which belong to the stockholder shall be sequestrated
and diverted from the owners, and thus injure vested rights/
The Legislature has the right, as an administrative measure,
to appoint a trustee, to take the assets and manage the
affairs of a corporation whose charter has been repealud. "
Upon the repeal of a charter by the Legislature acting
within the limits of its constitutional authority, the
corporation ceases to exist, and no judgment can be rendered
against it in an action at law.(Fecause there is no person
in esse against whom the judgment could be enfuorced ).
Sach a repual does not impair the obligation of contracts
made by the corporation with other parties during its
existtnce." (1) 7or while It 4s true that"if several men
enter into a valid contract, it cannot be altered fundiment-
ally but by the unavipous consent. " (2) Yet "Aorporation
(1) Thorton v Marginal rreLght Co.2'3 Mass.32.
(2) Merve-y v mid. R.R. 4 Piss.78.
by the very terms and nature of its political existunce
is subject to dissolution." "1ve-ri-cedito- must be pr-sumed
to , nderstand the nature and incidents of such a body
politic , and to contract with reference to them. (1)
It can rake no difference that those dealing with it
could not forsee"its future dissolution. (2)
-------------- ------------------------
v ?otornac R.R. 8 Pet.282, p.2S7.
(2)1:obile Ry. v Peo.21 Ala.573,36; See also Revere v
Boston Copper Co. 15 Pic.351.
1'., Dissolution Autho-ised byf Legislativu EY.actmeit.
There is ir most States four methods prescribed b,r the
Legislature for the volunta-v dissolution of corporations.
f'urin- the present winite- the Legislature of the State of No
New York,added a fifth. 1will very briefly outline these
proceedings ii the following order.
I Py Statutory- Proceding in Court.
II Ty a Re-organisation.
III by Re-incorporation.
IV Fy Consolidation.
V By the Sale of Entire Busimess to AnotherCorporation.
I By Statutory Procedings in Court.
I The Code of Civil Procudure #l2419-&,o1 ovides that
if a majority of the directors having having in charge the
management of a corporation created by or under the laws
of the State discover that the corporation is insolvent;
or if for any reason they deem it beneficial to the inter-
ists of the stockholders that the corporation be dissolved
they ma* present a verified petition to the court p-aying
for a dissolution under the order of' +he court.
Upon the receipt of the petition the court makes an
order requiring all persons interested ixn the corporation to
show cause before a referee why the corporation should not
be dissolved. If the corporation be insolvent, the court
may upon notice to the Atty.Gen. appoint a temporary rec-
eiver, who takes charge of all the assets . Upon the final
hearing the court may or may not: in its discretion make a
final order dissolving, the corporation. The receiver then
will collect and distribute its effectslpro rata, among the
creditors, and the balanceif any, pro rata among the
stockholders.
II By Re-incorporation.
Fy 1,32 of the General Corporation La-7 it is provided that
any domestic corporationg at any time within three rears
before its expiration thereof, rmay bztend the term of its
existancelbeyond the time specified in its original certifi-
cate of incorporation, by the consent of the stockholders
owning two-thirds of its capital stock,or if not a corpora-
tion having capital stock, by the consent of two thirds of
its members...Upon filing and recording ' such certificate
the corporation will be revived and extended, for a term
not excediwv- the tern of which it was incorporated in the
first instance.
II By Re-organization
When, thi property and franchises of a domestic corporatin-M
are sold by virtue of a mortgage o eed of trust, pursuant
to the judgment of a court 'The purchaser may associate irih
with hin any rnumer of persons, not less than the number
required by law for the incorporation of such corporations,
a majority of whom shall be citizens of trie State, may
become a corporation, and take and possess the property anid
franchises thus sold, upon filing a certificate of incorpor-
ation. (1)
(1) Stock Corporation La, ! .
IV By Consolidation.
The best illustration of the effect of consolidation of
corporations is to be found in what are termed railroads-
Vie have here to deal with the legal status of the corporatinn
before arid after consolidation,and the relation of thes
consolidated company to the creditorsof the old company.
Substantially tho same phenomineais presented here , as in
all other cases of combination, so I will treat it but once.
I,r. Justice Strong in delivering the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Railroad Co.v Georgia (1)said "The effect
of consolidation, as distinguished from a union by. merger
of one company into another, is to work a dissolutior of the
companies consolidating, and to create a new corporation
out of the former one.' In each case before it took place
the original companies existed and were irid-pedant of each
other,. It could not occur without their consent.
The consolidated company then had no legal existance.
It could have none while the origenal corporation subsisted
All-the old and the new could not co-exist. It was a can-
-r.Co. v Georgia 98 U.S.p.363.
±1/
dition preceaent to the exist-ence of the new corporation
that the old one should first surrender their validity and
submit to dissolution ... Whex the consolidation ",as complet-
ed, the old companies verdestroyed, a new one was created
and its powers were -ranteA to it." It has new powers, now
franchises and new stockholders. "(L)
As far as the creditors of one of the original companies
is concerned, the consolidated company is the successor of
the old cornpair, it is a nevr and ind-#penderit company, and
such creditor has no claim against it upon their original
contract; but only by virtue of' its assumption of the
obligations of the old companies."(')
(L) Pulman Car Co. v iMo. Pacific Co. 115 U.S.94.
(2) Boardman v Lake Shore 84 N.Y.181.
V By Sale of Franchises and Property.
Any stock corporation (except a railroad corporation)
may sell with the consent of 2A4 of its stockholders,its
entire property, and franchises, or any part thereof to any
domestic corporation engaged in the same business of the
same general character. Such sale shall shall vest the
rights and franchises thereby conferred in the corporation 4
to which they were conveyed. (1)
(1) Stock Corporation Law #33; as amended L.'93 Ch.638.
The Effect of Dissulution Uporn the Corporate Prop'ty
I As to Realty.
Under the common law, all the realestate owned by the
corporation at the date of the dissolution,and undisposed
0- - reverted to the grantor and his heirs. Tn the words
of Chancellor Kent, (1) "According to the well settled law
of the land, where there is no special statute providing to
the contrary, upon the civil death of a corporation, all its
real estate,remaining unsold, reverts to the origonal
grantor and his heirs." "For the reversion, in such an
event, is a condition annexed by law, ni as much as the
cause of the grant has failed." (2)
Equity; however, views the matter in quite a different
light. In equity the corporation is rugarded as a trustee
holding the corporate property for the benefit of its
creditors and stockholders, which, upon its dissolution or
civil death, a court of Chancery will lay hold of as a trust
(1) 2 Kent Com.307.
(2) Ang. & Am. on Corp. #77 .
fund, arid dis T- b" PIr h, b r, fit." (1) The common
law rule isr ecognised in New York as late as 184i) in the
case of Fringham v Weidereaux . (2) This doctvrine receiv-
ed its death blow at the hands of Justice Rapello in the
case of Heath v Parmore !50 N.Y.305where he holds that the
common law rule does not prevail in respect to stock
corporations. At the present time it seems fair to.say that
the rule has either been changed by statute, or by judicial
construction in most if not all the states, so far as it
applies to business corporations having capital stock.
But when dealing with corporations having no stockholder4
organised other than for pecuniary bfnefit, we must follow
and apply the commom law. The Supreme Court of Illinois
in the case of Mottv Dansville Seminary (3) took this view,;
they say that "The rule of the common law has been modified
and changed in modern times by courts of equity and Legis-
lative enactments. Such modifications and changes have
grown upavor~of corporations organised for pecuniary
(l)Fringham v Weidereaux I N.Y.509.
(2) Life Ins *Co. vTPasset 102 ill.323;See also How v
Robinson 20 7la. 352.
(3) Nott v Dansville Sem.i2lA 111.403.
profit. In regard to the latter the shareholders are
themselves the origirnal donors of the corporate property
each member contributing his share of the capital for the
common benefit of all; arid the corporation so long as it L-
solvent, holds the property given it merely as trustee for
its shareholders.., in 7nigland the doctrine that the
real estate owned by a corporation reverts to the origonal
owmer upor, dissolution, was first applied in case of
eccltsAtical andiunicipal corporations. The main reason
for such was that in those cases, there waeno shareholders,
and ordinarily no creditors, so thak the property was really
without an owner after the particular use, for which it had
been given, had come to an exd by a dissolution of the
corporate body.
These reasons, Which gave rise to the doct-ineand
originally justified its application, existed in the case
of the Dansville Seminary at the time when its dissolution
took place. It is the equity in favor of creditors and
shareholders, which prevents the enforsement of the rule,
when it is not follo,ed. No such equity exists in this
case... Ev terms of the charter there were to be no stock-
holders, and it was evidently contemplated, that tht instit-
ution of learning herein provided for would be organised
and supported by gifts and donations./..In the absencu of
statutory regulations to the contrary, the doctrine of
rcvorter to the origuina or his heirs in case of corporate
dissolution is applicable, at this day, to public and
eleemosrriary corporations, even in the view of a court of
equity.
In orde- to determine the law of thie State a detaLed
examination of the statutes is necessary. Put ]r general
it may be said(the statutes have provided that the property
of all churches and religeous societies shall upon the
extirnctiorn or abandonment of the same, vest in the trustees
of said corporationand after the payment of all existing
debts, the balamce, if any, shall be turned over to the
governing board of the demonination to which the extinct
church belonged. (I)
It is provided by statute that the property of all
educational corporations shall be distributed by the
(I) See 3,. Y. R. S. 1906-8,11P-19 and *73 of proposed
Religeous Corp. Law; Tcport of Stat. Rev. Com. '90 p1381-1 9 21.
Regents o" the University of th . State o0 ilew York 'n such
ways as they deem just and equitable. (I)
So far as I have carried my investigation, I have been
unable to find general laws applicable to hospitals,
Volunteer Fire Depts. and other similar non-membership
corporations. In which case, (rio special charter provision
to the contrary), it would follow that the real estate would
revert to the grantor and the personalty to the State.
(1) Laws of '92 Ch. 378 630; 5 R.S. (Red. )3540.
II As to Personalty.
As to personalty, the rules of the common law provided
that upon the corporate dissolution the property reverts to
the State. And under the circumstances.as given above, the
personalty of a dissolved corporation will revert to the r",
State.
Two recent cases have aris .n involving the distribution
of the property of Mutual Insurance companies, they are
Titcomb v YJennebank vutual Ins. Co. (i) and The Traders
Ins. Co. (2) In the former the Supreme Court of Maine
ordered the assets turnedover to the treasurer of the State;
on the following reasoning "It is said that in this class ,
of cases the corporation named in the act of incorporation
should be regarded as stockholders. They are not
stockholders/ and to hold that they are would be a fiction
there is no equity in favor of thecorporators of a mutual
insurance company. They contribute nothing towards its
(1) Titcomb v Yeenebick Mutual ins. 7 MLe.315.
(1) Traders Ins .Co. v Brown 142 MTass.403.
its assets, and we think that it would be contrary to public
policy to allow them to have a pecuniary interust in them..
We think there is a much stronger equitir in favor of the
former policy holders, whose money contributed to produce
assets. Put as they aant be regarded as stockholders after
their policies have expired and their previous rotes been
cancelled and given up. They have received the benefits
in full for which they contracted and are no longer before
members of the company. "
In the later case, the Massachusetts coutr after a care-
ful examination of their statute,held that in as much as
the promoters of the company had invested their capital
as a guarinty fund, which fund was liable for te company,
they should be allowed to share the profits arid so ordered
the property to be distribted.
